The main goal of this paper is to estimate the preferences of the Italian society towards equity in order to verify whether preferences i) have changed across the years, and ii) can be related to specific sociodemographic characteristics. Introducing equity concerns in the implementation of economic policies is a fundamental problem faced by both economists and policy makers. This paper uses a social welfare function a la Jorgenson and Slesnick to estimate society's aversion towards inequality by implementing a voting scheme for compiling individuals' equity preferences into a social choice by majority rule. The results show that preferences are highly polarized toward a low and a high concern for equity aversion and that this concern is significantly related with several sociodemographic characteristics. Among them, income plays an important role with richer people that tend to favor less equity. Results also show that preferences towards equity have changed across the years.
Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to measure the degree of aversion to inequality in Italian society in the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] and to investigate which variables were responsible for the changes in the degree of aversion over this period of time. In order to achieve this goal, we use a method for eliciting preferences towards equity that makes use of a social welfare function of the form introduced by Roberts (1980a) and empirically implemented by Jorgenson and Slesnick (1983, 1987) and Jorgenson (1990) .
The estimation of the degree of aversion to inequality of Italians is carried out in different steps. We first estimate the social welfare function of Italian households from the aggregation of individual preferences derived from demand estimates based on a 12-year time series of cross-sections ranging from 1985 to 1996. As a second step, we elicitate the social preferences about equity by designing a scheme that gives a hypothetical social observer the mandate to determine the price policy that optimizes the social welfare function conditional on different choices of the coefficient governing the curvature of the social welfare function and thus capturing society's degree of aversion to inequality ρ. In the third step, the social observer computes for each household the level of individual welfare associated with each price policy. Households cast their vote by "truthfully" revealing their most preferred price policy and, indirectly, preferred value for ρ.
1 The unique winner of the voting scheme is the median voter who reveals society's preferences towards inequality.
In our simulated poll every member of society votes rationally compatibly with personal incentives. Individuals in our model do not regard others altruistically. Rather, they consider only their own selfish interests when voting for equity. Households that would benefit under a policy regime that weights equity heavily prefer such a weighting and will vote for it. On the other hand, those who would be harmed by such policy regime prefer a policy criterion in which equity is unimportant and will vote for it.
According to our empirical results, we find that Italian preferences are polarized around a "low" and a "high" degree of aversion to inequality and that this concern is strongly related with several sociodemographic characteristics. As expected, income is an important factor and richer households are less concerned about equity. In general, preferences towards equity have changed substantially across the years. By majority rule, Italian society prefers a "high" degree of aversion to inequality over the entire period of investigation with the exception of the years 1990 and 1995.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes aggregate measures of inequality and poverty in Italy from 1985 to 1996 to gain some notion about possible changes in the level of toleration of Italians towards inequality and poverty. Section 3 introduces the concepts of equity, interpersonal comparisons and social welfare. Sections 4 through 6 present the methodological framework used to derive the distribution of ρ and implement the voting scheme. Section 7 describes the data set used. Section 8 reports the empirical results from the system of demand equations used to estimate the individual and social preferences 1 While it is rare in many democracies for all potential voters to exercise their voting right on any given election, in our model all households vote. Sen (1999) argues that when the goal is a measure of social welfare, actual voting should not be relied upon both because not all citizens vote and because voting simply conveys too little information regarding interpersonal comparisons of well-being. Our hypothetical voting scheme seems to follow Sen's advice, except that for us each single household constitutes a voter.
along with the mechanism design used to elicit the collective preferences concerning the degree of Italians'aversion towards inequality. Section 9 presents the regression results analyzing the influence of demographic characteristics over the choice of ρ with the aim of characterizing the voter profile. Section 10 presents our conclusive remarks.
Inequality and Poverty in Italy from 1985 to 1996
The period under examination has been characterized by a series of substantial social, economic, political and institutional events that may have changed the subjective perception of the Italian citizen and society about inequality at different points in time. In this section, we present a concise analysis of these events and make a conjecture about how they may have influenced households' economic behavior and the personal and social level of tolerance towards inequality.
It is widely recognized that during the last two decades income inequality has increased in all industrialized countries. The international variability of income distribution has increased as well. According to Atkinson et al. (1995) and Fritzell (1994) this situation has been determined by the social and economic policies implemented by single states over this period. These policies, and in particular wage and employment policies, have reduced the share of labour income over total income and increased inequality in labour income. Further, the paucity of transfer payments, such as child benefits, and tight fiscal and social reforms have exacerbated such inequalities.
In the case of Italy, during the 1980s policy makers coherently implemented economic and social policies which led to a slight increase in income inequality, despite the prolonged period of economic expansion experienced at the end of the '80s (Rossi 1994) . However, the difficult international economic conditions and the restrictive budgetary policies adopted to meet the Maastricht requirements in the early '90s did not significantly affect the distributive situation. For the period 1985-1996 under investigation, Figures 1 and 2 show the changes in poverty levels by employment category, as reflected by the head-count ratio, and in the levels of the Gini coefficients respectively.
2 The evolution of head-count ratios and Gini coefficients, computed using both household incomes and total expenditures, moves in a similar fashion. Both series step down between 1989 and 1990 and maintain the same level thereafter. This result is not surprising if we consider that the fiscal adjustment process started in 1992 probably was not worse than the disruptive distributive dynamics recorded during the '80s. Ex-post, the facts which occurred during the second half of the '80s can easily be considered as a "missed opportunity" to implement economic and social policies aimed at reducing poverty and inequality levels.
At the end of 1994 when the risk of financial bankruptcy incurred by the Italian public financial administration was over, social and economic policies shifted in the direction of achieving greater efficiency in order to achieve a higher level of competitiveness and economic growth. According to Rossi (1998) and Atella (2000) , this process was carried out without affecting the goals of social justice.
The events which occurred during the twelve years of our investigation strongly influenced household disposable incomes in terms of both levels and composition. The graph in Fig. 3 illustrates the rate of growth of the real permanent disposable income 3 of Italian households from 1970 to 1999. From this graph we can see that rates of growth increased during the '80s and decreased sharply in the first half of the '90s, while remained constant, though at a low level, in the second half. In Tab.1 we report the contribution of the individual components to the disposable income. The data show a sharp change over time of the importance of the individual components determining the rate of growth of disposable income. In particular, one can observe that the rate of growth of direct taxes increased substantially across the years determining a sharp reduction in disposable income. At the same time, the rate of growth in interest paid by the Public Administration for the public debt decreased, especially after 1988, while the component "other incomes" increased. This change is mainly attributable to the large shift of Italian households from the bond to the equity market due to the sharp fall of interest rates in the '90s. Finally, labour income also decreased in importance over time. During the '70s it represented 85 percent of the rate of growth of disposable income, while at the end of the '90s it accounted for only 24 percent.
In our view, the changes in the composition of household disposable income rates of growth which occurred during these years may also reflect a change in the attitude of Italian households towards equity. Intuitively, given the relative stability of aggregate inequality and poverty throughout the period under consideration, once may suspect that the degree of aversion towards inequality was also stable. To evaluate this conjecture, we use a novel mechanism to elicit social preferences about equity, described in the following sections.
3 Equity, interpersonal comparisons and social welfare
How much weight should be given to equity concerns in policymaking? Economic analysis often focuses on Pareto efficiency. One of the appealing features of the Pareto criterion is that it requires neither a cardinal utility measure nor interpersonal comparisons of utility. But this criterion yields only a partial ordering: in a given setting many alternatives will be efficient and the criterion gives no guidance about which of them should be chosen. An equity-based criterion might go further, delivering a unique policy recommendation that optimally redistributes welfare across members of a society.
In this paper we make use of an equity-based social welfare function (SWF) which requires the imposition of cardinality and interpersonal comparability conditions. From Arrow (1963) we know that if individual welfares are ordinal and noncomparable, any SWF must be dictatorial. The same is true for cardinal and noncomparable (Sen 1979 ) and for ordinal and comparable (Roberts 1980b) individual utilities. By assuming both cardinality and interpersonal comparability which together imply that a great deal is known about individual welfare orderings, a broad range of social welfare functions becomes available.
Cardinal full comparability (CFC), which requires that a SWF be invariant when all individual welfare orderings are transformed by the same affine function, permits great flexibility in the choice of a social welfare function. This is especially attractive for empirical work. Roberts (1980a) showed that under CFC one can always find a SWF, W , such that for any two social states x and y, W (U (x)) > W(U (y)) if x is strictly preferred to y according to the social ordering, where U is the vector of individual welfare orderings. If we let U (x) denote the average of individual utilities, then Roberts's SWF takes the form
where g measures the dispersion in individual welfare levels. According to this function, social welfare increases when average individual welfare increases, but falls when dispersion in individual welfare increases. Even after one has decided to employ CFC utilities, incorporating equity concerns in an empirical setting remains challenging for at least three reasons. First, the CFC assumption must be operationalized in a way that leads to a meaningful money-metric measure of cardinal and comparable individual utilities. In practice, this can be accomplished by introducing demographic information in a plausible demand system. Actual income is scaled by an adult equivalence scale that accounts for the heterogeneous demographic makeup of households. Under certain conditions the resulting scaled income can play the role of a money-metric measure of utility.
Second, one has to select a specific functional form for the SWF, one that reflects a degree of aversion to inequality. We employ the SWF of Jorgenson (1990) and Jorgenson and Slesnick (1983, 1987) . This SWF captures society's preferences towards inequality in elegant fashion through the use of a single "equity" parameter, ρ , describing the curvature of social indifference curves.
Third, one must choose a particular value for the degree of inequality ρ in the SWF. Coggins and Perali (2002) have shown that the choice of ρ is critical because it significantly affects the curvature of the social welfare function and hence the associated policy and welfare analysis. In the literature, two main approaches to estimating social equity preferences can be found. The one described by Christiansen and Jansen (1978) and Stern (1978) involves deducing the level of equity preferences from government tax decisions. The approach presented in Amiel et al., (1999) involves estimating aggregate equity preferences through experimental methods. The model presented in this paper represents a new approach to the problem.
4
The methodological framework
Interpersonally comparable individual welfare
Suppose that a household obeys a direct utility function of the form U * (q k ), where q k denotes the n-vector of goods available at prices p consumed by household k (k = 1, . . . K). Corresponding to U is a cost (or expenditure) function of the form C * (U, p), which yields the cost to the household of achieving utility level U at prices p.
4 Let d k denote a vector of demographic variables, such as household size, age, level of education, specific to household k. Lewbel's modifying technique consistes in defining a general cost function of the form Lewbel (1985) presents conditions that must be satisfied by f in order for C to be a legitimate cost function 4 . Note that by construction C will take the value of household income y k .
The modifying function approach is a generalization of a variety of specific approaches to the problem of incorporating demographic information into a demand system. These include the translating and scaling approaches, the Gorman (1976) approach that combines translating and scaling, and also reverse Gorman as developed in Wales (1981, 1992) . The demographic specification used in this study is the Barten (1964) approach.
Our aim in this paper is to use a measure of household welfare accompanying the cost function demographically modified a la Barten to compare the level of social welfare for various economic policies. For this purpose we shall need a household equivalence scale m 0 (p, d k ), depending on prices and demographic characteristics, that describes the number of equivalent adults in the household. This scale can be used to form a money measure of welfare that is comparable across households. A household's equivalent income is given by y k /m 0 (p, d k ). If a two-adult household with an income of $60,000 has m 0 = 1.5, for example, then each of its members achieves the same level of utility as a single adult with an income of $40,000. Similarly, if a household with two adults and two children with income of $60,000 has m 0 = 3.0, then each of its members achieves the same level of utility as a single adult with an income of $20,000.
The scale m 0 can be written in this manner, without utility as an argument, only if it is independent of the base level of income (IB) chosen for comparison (Lewbel 1989) . The IB property of equivalence scales permits interhousehold comparisons to be computed exactly (Blackorby and Donaldson 1991.) Suppose that demand is specified as the Almost Ideal Demand System of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) . The Barten demographically modified AIDS cost function, expressed in logarithms, is
This cost function is in the Gorman polar form (Blackorby, Boyce and Russell 1978) , from which the AIDS is derived using the Barten-Gorman demographic transformation. In (1), the ln A, and B terms are expressions depending upon the parameters in a Barten demographically modified demand system
where i = {1, .., n} indexes the goods. In equations (3),
is the price of good i scaled by the Barten (1964) commodity-specific scheme. The scaling demographic function is specified as
The parameters α i , β i , and γ ij , and also δ ir , are to be estimated using the following share demand system, derived from equation (2) and equations (3):
where ln y * k = ln y k . In order for the scale m 0 to be IB, it is necessary that the B(p, d k ) term be independent of d k . Let us suppose that it is. Then following Lewbel (1989) , write the modified cost function
for some function G 5 . The separability of d k from u in the two terms on the right side of (5) makes the IB property convenient. In the demographically modified AIDS framework we may write
which, combined with (5), yields the following money metric of utility describing the distribution of welfare (Lewbel 1989; Blackorby and Donaldson 1988 )
Equation (7) highlights an important feature of the interpersonally comparable nature of this setup. Note that everything specific to a household's preferences appears on the left hand; the right is an affine transformation of utility levels u. Thus, it accords with Roberts' (1980a) definition of cardinal full comparability (CFC) of utilities 6 . Once again employing the notation of the Barten-Gorman demographically modified AIDS framework, the equivalence scale m 0 may be written in log form as
Upon rearranging equation (5), the indirect utility function for household k may be written
where by definition
Social welfare
Suppose that the welfare of society is determined according to the following social welfare function taken from Jorgenson and Slesnick (1983, 1987) and Jorgenson (1990 and 1997) . Let U denote the K-dimensional vector of household utility levels, and let x denote the state of the world. The social welfare function takes the form
where
and
is the scale for a reference household. In a time series application, like the one following, it is natural to let this reference household correspond to the household in period 1.
The first term in (10) is the average of money metric welfare across households. The second term is a measure of dispersion (or inequality) in money metric welfare. For a given level of average welfare, social welfare declines as the inequality in welfare increases. The γ(x) term in (10) is constructed so as to permit the highest possible value that satisfies the Pareto principle. It is conceivable, for general definitions of γ(x), that social welfare might fall as a result of an increase in one household's welfare level. As W is defined in (10), this cannot happen. With the definition for γ(x) used here, the second term in (10) is as large as it can be while still ensuring that W never decreases as ln V k increases for some household k.
The parameter ρ captures society's "degree of aversion to inequality" (Jorgenson 1990, p. 1025), which is the same thing as the degree of curvature of the welfare function in ln V space. It takes values on the interval (−∞, −1]. If ρ = −∞, then the second term in (10) disappears and the social welfare function becomes utilitarian. If ρ takes its maximum value of −1 then society places the greatest possible value upon equity. We turn now to a model of a social observer who is considering an economic policy that is designed to maximize W given ρ, and the accompanying scheme for estimating the value for ρ that actually reflects society's attitudes towards equity.
Voting for equity
In this section we develop a scheme for recovering society's preferences towards inequality from demand behavior and demographic characteristics. The informational assumptions placed upon the problem are crucial. It is assumed that the social observer does not know the structure of individual welfare functions. Rather, the observer knows only how to use the computer program managing the solution algorithm for ρ. This constraint on the social observer information set excludes any possibility of manipulation by the social observer and explains the observer's decision to collect the households' votes over ρ. Each household knows only its own cost function, and it is also privy to the information it needs in order to make its selection in the voting scheme. Let Ω k denote the information held by household k.By assumption, households do not behave strategically while participating in the voting scheme.
The voting for equity scheme is recursive in nature, comprising two parts. For any given ρ, the observer's goal is to set prices so as to maximize social welfare W (U, x | ρ). Price policies are not uncommon in actual practice, of course, though in a market economy one would not expect to witness centralized selection of a complete vector of prices. It would be possible to adapt the model by incorporating alternative policy instruments-including quantity restrictions or income transfers.
The first part, then, consists in the observer devising a table, each row of which corresponds to a value for ρ. The distance between ρ's may be as small as desired. The remaining entries in a row of the table consist of a price vector with the property that for the corresponding ρ, this price vector yields a maximum to W (U, x | ρ).
In the second part of the scheme, the observer sends each household a copy of the table, and each household calculates its own level of welfare ln V k at every price vector in the table. The household then returns a ballot on which it has recorded the value of ρ for which the corresponding price yields a maximum to ln V k . Let this report be denoted ρ * k . In the final step the K-vector of ρ * k 's is combined into a social choice, ρ * . In this last step, the median value of the ρ * k 's is announced as society's choice of aversion to inequality. This scheme may be thought of as a constitutional convention for carrying out social policy. The social observer can be compared to a computer calculating, for any conceivable value of ρ, the price vector that maximizes W (U, x | ρ) in (10). The observer only needs to be given the appropriate ρ parameter in order to choose the best policy. The parameter itself is voted upon by society, with each household casting a single ballot on which it has noted its preferred value for ρ. We suppose that the winning ρ defeats all alternatives in a pairwise majority vote.
The social observer's problem
The social observer is free to consider setting prices however he chooses, so long as p i > 0 for each good i. Demands are homogeneous of degree zero in prices; it is assumed the prices are normalized by setting p n = 1. Then the set of prices that is available-the social observer's "choice set"-is P = R n−1 ++ . The problem for the observer is to maximize W (U, x | ρ) on P . Let p * (ρ) denote the solution to this problem:
We assume that the observer's table is finite in length. That is, there is some finite T sufficiently large that | ρ * |< T . The search, then, will take place on the interval [−T, −1]. Problem (7) is well defined only if W is strictly concave in p and achieves a unique maximum on P . Numerical evidence from our empirical analysis suggests that W has this property. Let us suppose that the observer's problem does indeed have a unique solution for each ρ 7 .
The households' problem.
Upon inserting p * (ρ) into its own money metric welfare function ln V k , household k can calculate its welfare as a function of ρ. The household's problem is to calculate the value of ρ at which its welfare level is maximized. Its informational resource Ω k limits the household to responding to the observer's query with its preferred level for ρ.
Note that ρ * k is a composite mapping that depends upon ρ indirectly through p * (ρ).
Because ln V k is a continuous function defined on a closed set, it must achieve a maximum on [−T, −1]. If ρ * k achieves a maximum over an interval-if there are multiple values of ρ that yield the same level of welfare-then we assume that the household selects the one with the smallest absolute value 8 .
6.2 The voting for equity scheme.
Our scheme for deducing society's collective opinion concerning the level of equity that should be incorporated in policy making-the choice of ρ-involves compiling the individual ρ * k into a single value ρ * . For this purpose we assume majority rule, with households now playing the role of voters.
Consider the K-vector (ρ * 1 , . . . , ρ * K ) of optimal ρ's. We assume that in any pair-wise vote, each of the non-interactive households naively selects the value for ρ that is nearest ρ * k according to the Euclidean distance metric. Given this assumption, Black's (1948) median voter theorem guarantees that the median of the ρ * k 's will be a majority rule winner. Denote this median by ρ * . Define a voting for equity scheme S by (i) a set of individual money metric welfare functions (ln V 1 , . . . , ln V K ); and (ii) the social welfare function W . We now provide a definition for a solution for S. This definition requires simply that households choose optimally, that the majority rule winner is selected as society's optimal ρ, and that given this value the social observer selects a price vector according to (13) 9 .
Definition :Given a voting for equity scheme S, a solution is a pair (ρ * , p * ) at which (i) households choose ρ * k according to (14) and ρ * is the median of the ρ * k , and (ii) p * solves (13) given ρ * .
The dataset
This section reports information concerning the data from twelve different expenditure surveys conducted by the Italian National Institute of Statistics from 1985 to 1996. The samples are composed of about 30,000 households. The surveys are representative of the Italian population. Expenditures were collected during weekly interviews using the "booklet method" with recall. After general checks for consistency, 22,740 households were selected for the years from 1989 to 1995 and 19,581 households in 1996. Goods were aggregated into three large categories expressed as expenditure shares: food, including food consumed away from home (FOODSH), education (EDUSH), and all other goods (OTHSH) such as housing, health, clothing for adults, clothing for children, energy and transportation. This high level of aggregation was chosen with the aim of enhancing our ability to control the social welfare experiment. We selected 12 demographic variables. They include the number of children five years of age or less (NCH05), the number of children from 6 to 14 years of age (NCH614), the number of children from 15 to 18 years of age (NCH1518), the number of adults (>18 years), and dummy variables for the presence of a women as head of the household (SEX_F), of a self-employed head of the household (L_IND), of a working wife (TS), of a household located in a rural area, of a household located in the North of Italy (R1), of a household located in the South of Italy (R3), of a household with at least one invalid component (INVALIDS), and of a household with at least one elderly component (NANZ). Prices were obtained using the methodology developed by Lewbel (1989) and described in Atella, Menon and Perali (2002) . Table 2 contains summary statistics, for selected years, of the shares, log prices, log of total expenditure (LNXH) and demographic variables included in the model. As we can observe, households' consumption behaviour changed across the period of investigation, as did socio-demographic characteristics. The share of food consumption decreased from about 35 percent in 1985 to 25.4 percent in 1996. The education share increased slightly, while the share of other goods increased in order to compensate the change in food consumption. In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, we note that the number of children below 18 years has decreased significantly (especially in the age band from 5 to 14 years), indicating a decrease in fertility rate of the Italian household. At the same time the number of adults (>18 years) remained almost constant, while the average family size has decreased slightly. The number of households with a female head has increased (0,17 in 1985 vs. 0,20 in 1996) as well as the number of households with a working spouse (from 0,26 in 1985 to 0.31 in 1996). The number of households living in rural areas decreased steadily up to 1996. The number of household members with physical limitations decreased. In line with the progressive aging of the population, the number of elderly increased.
The empirical analysis
The estimation of the Barten demographically modified linear-in-log-y AIDS model maximizes a concentrated likelihood function of the joint system of Food, Education and Other Goods shares. The system has been estimated imposing the theoretical requirements of symmetry and homogeneity, and the IB requirements for cardinal comparability (Lewbel 1989) as maintained hypotheses.
Econometric results
Convergence of the models was obtained in few iterations, despite the high non-linearity of the model and the relatively high number of socio-demographic variables included 10 . Individual preferences must be well-behaved in order to be aggregated into a plausible social welfare function. The estimated uncompensated, compensated price and expenditure elasticities are reported in table 3 for selected years. The signs of the own-price effects conform with the Slutsky requirements at the data means. Concavity, as verified by computing eigenvalues at each observation, is maintained over a large region of the data for most years. This behavioural requirement is of special importance in the present study. In fact, concavity of the individual welfare functions is necessary for concavity of the social welfare function and thus the estimated demand system can reasonably be used to carry out welfare analysis.
The signs and magnitudes of the own and cross-price elasticities (compensated and uncompensated), reported in the second and third panel of table 3, are reasonable, significantly different from zero and in line with those estimated for other studies. The cross-price effects are sign consistent, as required, and show both substitution and complementarity effects, with the exception of the compensated elasticities in 1996 that present only substitution effects. The expenditure elasticities for education and other goods remain fixed over the whole time period. However, food elasticities increase slightly over time.
The marginal effects of the demographic characteristics included in the model, presented in table A.2 of the appendix, are in general significantly different from zero. Interestingly, the signs and magnitudes of these elasticities change across the years. This is in contrast with the results we have seen for income and price elasticities, thus indicating that the Barten specification captures the sample heterogeneity effectively. As expected, the presence of young children is positively related to food expenditure and negatively related to the education share. Over the years this effect increased. On average, expenditure on education is negatively related to the presence of very young children, while positively related to older children. This effect is maintained across the years. The presence of a self-employed head of household does not seem to lead to differences in terms of expenditure pattern. Working wives have a negative effect on food consumption and a positive effect on household expenditure on education. These results are quite reasonable, and in line with the values of the income elasticity of education share, given that a working wife makes it possible to increase household income. Living in rural areas, on the other hand, has a positive effect on both food and education shares. Living in the North of Italy has a positive effect on food. Again, for those living in the North of Italy the elasticity of expenditure on education moves from negative values in the mid '80s to high positive values at the end of our period of investigation. Invalids and the elderly have strong positive effects on food and negative effects on education. Similar results are 10 The values of the estimated demand parameters are reporetd in the appendix in Table  A.1. found for the number of components in the household.
These results are in line with the general observed behavior and confirm the robustness of our approach in modelling household behavioural heterogeneity. As will be shown later, heterogeneity turns out to be an important factor in explaining households' voting behaviour.
The degree of aversion to inequality in Italy
As a further step to estimate the degree of aversion to inequality we have carried out the calculations of p * (ρ) (eq. (13)) and the ρ * k (eq. (14)) numerically. We take values of ρ in the interval from −1 to −10, in increments of 0.1. The solution to (14) is calculated for the 91 values of ρ in this grid.
Inspection of the plots of the surfaces and of the level curves of the observer's objective functions W for each year shows the location of the optimal price vectors, which is a global optimum 11 . In table 7, and just for 1996, we report the relationship between selected values of ρ and the corresponding optimal prices 12 . The difference between lnV and W in eq.(10) associated with the price policy scheme at each ρ is the value of the equity term. When ρ reaches −9, the optimal policy ceases its movement. This is because at this level the equity term in (10) becomes negligible, and the observer's objective becomes the maximization of average welfare.
A household, being interested only in its own welfare, does not care about social welfare but only about the relationship between ρ and its own lnV k . Using this fact, we solve each household's problem by calculating lnV k for each ρ, using the corresponding price pair (p 1 , p 2 ). The ρ corresponding to the maximum lnV k is selected as the household's choice. It has been denoted ρ k , and equals the value that household k writes on the ballot in the voting-for-equity scheme.
The distribution of households votes for ρ * k is presented in Fig. 4 for each year of the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . In each year, the distributions are bimodal and suggestive of an insight by Downs (1957) regarding the outcome of a social choice problem in a single dimension. The right density of the votes showing a preference towards less equity to matter is in general more dispersed. Across the years, the polarization of the vote around "low" and "high" values has changed substantially. It is interesting to note that in 1996, the first year in which Italians have voted using a majoritarian electoral system, the degree of polarization reaches a maximum. The majority outcome for the twelve years of our surveys, as given by the median, is reported in Fig. 5 . These are the equity levels that society chooses in response to the optimal price policy. Although these values have not changed much across the period of investigation, the distribution of votes has, on the other hand, changed quite markedly.
This information provides some remarkable evidence. With the exception of the years 1990 and 1995, the share of households oriented towards equity is consistently above 50 percent and is quite stable. In contrast, the share of less equity oriented households is more variable, with the highest values (about 42 percent) reached in 1990, 1995 and 1996 . The share of non-oriented households is rather small (with the exception of 1991) and whenever the share of less equityoriented households increased, this reduced the share of non oriented households (except in 1990), rather than the share of less equity-oriented households. It is interesting to fix the attention to the 1993 distribution. As already discussed in the second paragraph, the year 1993 represents both the year of the political break and the negative peak of one of the worst recession periods since the Second World War. It is also the year in which the rate of growth of permanent disposable income reaches its minimum (see Fig. 2 ). It is then remarkable to observe that in 1993 we record the highest share of equity oriented-households (75 percent).
With the aim of learning something about the relative importance of the level of household income in determining the voting outcome, we conduct the experiment of running elections for specific segments of the population partitioned in income quantiles choosing the 1996 population as our reference. In general, poor households are associated with a higher preference towards equity than more affluent households. As shown in Fig. 6 , the outcomes are collapsed into three classes according to the following classification: more equity-oriented households (−1 ≤ ρ ≤ −30), equity-uncertain households (−31 ≤ ρ ≤ −60), and less equity-oriented households (−61 ≤ ρ ≤ 91). The results are reported for the whole population, for the first and second decile (the first quintile), the second, third and fourth quintile, and for the ninth and tenth decile. Inspection of Fig. 6 reveals that the number of households that presents a higher degree of aversion to inequality decreases moving from the first to the tenth decile. In the first decile, about 75 percent of the households presents a high degree of aversion to inequality. This value drops to 47 percent in the ninth decile and to 51 percent in the tenth decile. Contemporaneously, the share of households that prefer inequality increases across deciles. In the second and third quintile the share of uncertain voters dominate the voters giving less importance to equity.
For the reference year 1996, we also look at the distribution of votes for the whole population by income quintile. The pattern is the one showed in Fig.  7 . In the first quintile, about 70 percent of the population is more concerned for equity. This proportion decreases monotonically but at a decreasing rate moving towards the higher quintile where the proportion is about 49 percent.
Determinants of the Attitudes towards Inequality
Another interesting aspect of the empirical analysis is to explore the links existing between the household choice of the degree of aversion to inequality and their socio-demographic characteristics. The literature on the determinants of "attitudes towards inequality" is vast. Different theories have been presented to explain differential preferences about inequality. According to Shurcke (2001) 13 , the following is the list of the main determinants that have been explored in the literature: individual's current icome (Romer, 1975) , Metzeler and Richards, 1981), individual's expected future icome (Hirschman, 1973, Bénabou and Ok, 2001 ), individual's mobility experience (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2001 ), perception of determinants of income generation ("achievements" vs. "ascription") (Cornero and Grüner, 2000) , and perception of actual income inquality in society (Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2001) . Apart from the work by Shurcke (2001), we are not aware of any empirical analysis which has verified such assumptions jointly.
While our dataset enables us to test the hypotheses of individual's current income (Romer, 1975) , Metzeler and Richards, 1981) , and individual's expected future income (Hirschman, 1973, Bénabou and Ok, 2001) as proxied by the level of education of the household head, we can study how preferences vary across different household demographic profiles. In other words, we aim at understanding how preferences towards equity differ in poor and rich households, in households with a high and a low level of children, in large households versus small households, in the South and in the North.
In order to shed light on this relationship, we use an ordered probit model to regress the vector of ρ * k on households' characteristics and total expenditure, using robust standard errors to account for the presence of heteroskedasticity. As dependent variable we have used a categorical variable generated according to the following classification: 1 if more equity-oriented (−1 ≤ ρ ≤ −20), 2 if undecided (−21 ≤ ρ ≤ −70), and 3 if less equity-oriented (−71 ≤ ρ ≤ 91)
14 . From the econometric point of view we have approached the problem using a "year-by-year" estimation strategy and a "pooled" fixed effect estimation strategy in which we have included time dummies for the 12 years and a variable that takes into account the level of household confidence over the period of investigation, thus representing another fixed effect.
The "pooled" results are reported in table 5. Inspection of table 5 shows that, overall, equity matters more for households with lower incomes, higher levels of education, relatively older, having a working wife, or mothers living alone. In terms of generational composition, singles, elderly singles, couples from 18 to 65 years and couples with children seem to care more for equity than elderly couples and three-generation households. The business cycle, measured as an index of the level of household confidence, is another important variable 13 The interested reader may refer to this paper for a more adequate description of such theories 14 We have also explored a probit model where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 0 when the value of ρ * k is in the range [0, −20] (more equity-oriented households), and 1 otherwise (non-oriented and less equity-oriented households), and an ordered probit model with a different grouping of ρ * k , namely 1 if equity-oriented household (−1 ≤ ρ ≤ −30), 2 if undecided (−31 ≤ ρ ≤ −60), and 3 if non equity-oriented household (−61 ≤ ρ ≤ −91). The results do not show relevant differences and are therefore omitted here. They are available upon request to the authors. that drives the vote towards a lower concern for equity when confidence is high. Interestingly, if we assume that education is a reasonable proxy for expected future income, our results show that individual's current income is more important than individual's expected future income in determining attitude towards inequality.
Conclusions
The main goal of the paper has been to estimate the preferences of Italian society towards equity in order i) to measure the degree of aversion towards inequality in Italian society and ii) to verify whether preferences have changed across the years. Introducing equity concerns in the implementation of economic policies is a fundamental problem faced by both economists and policy makers. The paper uses a social welfare function, a la Jorgenson and Slesnick, to estimate society's aversion towards inequality by implementing a voting scheme for compiling individuals' equity preferences into a social choice by majority rule. The social welfare function has been estimated from ISTAT household budget data accounting for household heterogeneity and imposing the property of independence of the base level of utility chosen for welfare comparisons as required by full cardinal comparability. The social welfare function expressed in terms of prices, income and a chosen degree of aversion to inequality is then maximized for the optimal set of prices associated with sequential values for the aversion coefficient. Our incentive compatible voting mechanism asks households to "vote" for the set of prices which would maximise their individual welfare, thus revealing the "single peaked" individual preferences towards equity associated with the best prices. Society's aversion to inequality is that of the median voter.
Can the values for ρ * k that we have obtained legitimately be called households' equity preferences? We believe that they can. It is true that households in our model have no concern for the welfare of others. People are interested only in themselves, and their preferred level of equity yields the greatest personal welfare. We deem that this is an interesting way to view individual equity preferences. In a democratic society an entirely separate rule, such as the majority rule that we employ, should be used to extract collective equity preferences from a profile of individual preferences. Without doubt, it is admissible that individual concerns for equity can also result from altruistic impulses, but in our view one of the virtues of our approach is that we are able to produce a collective concern for equity while retaining the utility-optimising framework for households.
In line with Coggins and Perali (2002) , our empirical results for the Italian case confirm that preferences are polarized around a low and a high degree of aversion to inequality and show that preferences changed over the years and were affected by the Italian economic performance. This effect was particularly visible in 1993, a year of sharp recession. Overall, equity matters more for households with lower incomes, higher levels of education, a working wife, and for relatively older households or single mothers. In terms of generational composition, sin-gles, elderly singles, couples from 18 to 65 years and couples with children seem to care more for equity than elderly couples and three generation-households. The business cycle, measured as an index of the level of household confidence, is another important variable making the public less concerned about equity when the confidence in the economy is high. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Salaried Managers Blue collars White collars Self employed Source: Our calculation on Bank of Italy data 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Household income Household expenditure Source: Our calculation on Bank of Italy data Source: Atella (200b) Source: Atella (2000) . 9  13  17  21  25  29  33  37  41  45  49  53  57  61  65  69  73  77  81  85 9  13  17  21  25  29  33  37  41  45  49  53  57  61  65  69  73  77  81  85 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 More Equity (1-30) In between (31-60) Less equity (61-91) Table 5 Determinants of ρ 
* -Pooled dataset

